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1Executive Summary
This paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of com-
petition and incentives without relying on the standard proﬁt-oriented “mar-
ket” model in the context of the debates about public service reform in the
U.K. It uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a
mission, and discusses how decentralized service provision can raise produc-
tivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions. Our focus
on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public
versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private
non-proﬁts. We also address concerns about the consequences of allowing
more ﬂexibility in mission design and competition on inequality.
The paper accepts the basic premise that it is important to blur the
traditional distinction between public and private sectors. However, to that
e n d ,ak e yi s s u ei st oc h a n g eh o wt h et e r m“ p u b l i c ”i st ob eu n d e r s t o o d
when referring to public services. It is confusing, to equate “public” with
public ownership. The government might undertake the production of, say,
automobiles. In a literal sense it would then be part of the public-sector.
However, the optimal organization design issues here would be no diﬀerent
than those faced by GM or Ford. Instead, we suggest that the term public
reﬂects the fact that these are services produced for the beneﬁt of the public
at large, i.e., goods whose consumption yields collective beneﬁts.
When it comes to public service reform, what matters for eﬀective deliv-
ery of public goods and services are accountability structures and incentives.
Ownership issues are given far too much weight in existing debates about
public service reforms. The mission of organizations is important in moti-
vating agents in public services. It is important to think about how the mis-
sion of the organization and hence the motivation of the agents are aﬀected
by proposals to reform public services. The main potential for competition
in public services lies in achieving matching providers and employees in the
labor market and in matching customers to providers. Better matching re-
duces the need for giving incentives and can enhance productivity. This
logic underpins the move towards greater decentralization and choice in pub-
lic service provision.
But there are legitimate concerns. Public service reform of the kind that
we describe puts a premium on mobility and information which is likely
to favor the rich. Our approach emphasizes that gains for some do not
necessarily come at the expense of losses to others. Indeed, it is possible
2(theoretically) that the quality of all public services improves. Clearly, this
is the rosy scenario on which many current policy initiatives are premised.
The reality will become clear in due course. At the same time, it is clear
that the centralized model with little diversity and a lot administrative costs
is now on the back foot. Our approach discusses the drawbacks theoretically.
However, theory (at best) can only help us understand the big picture a bit
better in the light of available evidence. In the path ahead of us the challenge
lies in the details.
31 Introduction
Reforming public-service delivery occupies a central position in the current
policy agenda both in the U.K. and elsewhere in the world. However, no clear
theoretical framework, has yet emerged for the study of these problems.1
A key issue is whether problems of public-service delivery are qualitatively
diﬀerent from manufacturing state-of-the-art motor vehicles or running a
good travel agency. If there is nothing especially diﬀerent, then we can
draw on the vast knowledge base available for studying the private sector
to discuss issues in public service delivery.2 Many discussions proceed as if
the agenda is exactly that — to merge the distinction between the public and
private. To that end, two features of private market activity have caught
the attention of would-be reformers — the role of choice and competition, and
the use of incentives.
The role of this paper is to discuss some aspects of competition and
incentive design which are relevant to on-going policy debates in the U.K. and
elsewhere. The paper accepts the basic premise that it is important to blur
the traditional distinction between public and private sectors. However, to
t h a te n d ,ak e yi s s u ei st oc h a n g eh o wt h et e r m“ p u b l i c ”i st ob eu n d e r s t o o d
when referring to public services. It is confusing, to equate “public” with
public ownership. The government might undertake the production of, say,
automobiles. In a literal sense it would then be part of the public-sector.
However, the optimal organization design issues here would be no diﬀerent
than those faced by GM or Ford.
Instead, we suggest that the term public reﬂects the fact that these are
services produced for the beneﬁt of the public at large, i.e., goods whose
consumption yields collective beneﬁts. Thus, public services are goods that
an unregulated market will tend to under-provide. There are three well
known reasons:
• External beneﬁts — societies with healthier and better educated pop-
ulations beneﬁt everybody not just those whose health or education
is at stake. This could be because we care about others, or, more
1It is striking that the public economics literature of twenty years ago (as summarized
in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)) paid almost no attention to incentive problems in public
production.
2See Nickell (1995) for an excellent overview of factors governing private sector perfor-
mance.
4instrumentally, because better education reduces crime or dependence
on the state or raises the quality of public discourse.
• Egalitarianism — the hallmark of any civilized society is to deliver some
minimum levels of consumption of key goods (such as health care or
housing) to its population.
• Merit Goods — Individuals may not understand or appreciate the ben-
eﬁts that can result from consumption of goods such as education and
health services. This could be due to information problems, or because
of the failure of rational forward-looking decision making typically as-
sumed in economics. Also, agency problems could arise if parents do
not value the education of their children suﬃciently.
Markets fail in these contexts because price signals do not adequately
reﬂect the social value of consumption. The existence of these concerns lead
to solutions for provision of public-services that attenuate the use of the
proﬁt-motive, which is the driving force behind market provision. However,
there is much debate about the precise form that these alternative models of
provision should take.
The traditional model in the U.K. has been centralized government pro-
vision with an attempt to achieve a fairly uniform system of provision across
the country as a whole with the major initiatives dictated by the centre. But
this has increasingly come under ﬁre in recent times. The main criticisms
are:
• Absence of Choice — individuals needs and preferences diﬀer (e.g., con-
cerning the importance of preventive care in the health context or im-
portance of extra-curricular activities in schools), but public services
tend to focus on one-size-ﬁts all provision.
• Ineﬃciency in production — providers of services face limited incentives
to improve service quality of service since service-users are not viewed
as “customers” as in the private-sector, whose satisfaction is key to
their own survival. Also, they have no incentives to cut costs because
of the operation of soft budget constraints.
The current reforms are part of an eﬀort that started in the Thatcher
years which have increasingly tried to move away from this model creating
5greater scope for diversity and local initiatives. However, those advocating
borrowing ideas from the private sector and introducing elements of choice,
incentives and competition sometimes tend to forget that these goods and
services are fundamentally diﬀerent from standard private goods and so what
works in the private sector may not necessarily work here. Moreover, putting
power in the hands of the patient or parent or giving incentives to a hospital
manager to cut costs means that these spheres too may be dominated by the
inequalities in private resources.
On the other hand, as evidenced in the recent debate on Foundation Hos-
pitals in the UK, traditionalists who resist reform tend to under-emphasize
the costs of centralized public provision, with the implicit belief being the
gains in terms of equality of the present system are far more important com-
pared to the losses in terms of eﬃciency. Moreover, there is considerable
evidence that even under this model, service provision remains inequitable
with too many failing schools and hospitals being located in areas with great-
est deprivation, with resources being diverted to those who are best able to
manipulate the system, namely the educated and articulate middle classes
(see Le Grand (1991), and the references cited there). Therefore, it seems
important to explore the possibility of reforms that create win-win situations
where gains from eﬃciency do not necessarily come at the expense of equality.
These debates would beneﬁt from having a conceptual framework to
study competition and incentives which does not rely on the standard proﬁt-
oriented model of production. There is a long-standing role in the U.K.
and elsewhere for the “third” sector — non-governmental organizations that
produce goods and services, but do not do so for proﬁt.3 There is also an ex-
tensive literature in economics on the not-for-proﬁt sector (see, for example,
Weisbrod (1988)).
However, there is little unity between this literature and the literature on
the public sector. This gives the impression that public and private ownership
are such fundamentally diﬀerent things that these organizations have little in
common. While we do not wish to underemphasize the importance of owner-
ship (see the discussion in section 5.2) we would like to argue that these orga-
nizations share similar organization-design concerns relating to the structure
of accountability, incentives, and the extent of competition for service-users
as well as personnel.4
3See, for example, Billis and Glennerster (1998).
4The role of the third sector in the U.K. is frequently discussed in relation to the legal
6This paper suggests an approach to public organizations that tries to
unify the disparate discussions of the role of private non-proﬁt activity and
public bureaucracies. It builds on the unifying theme that not-for-proﬁt
activity and public sector bureaucracies are organizations that try to cohere
around a mission. The notion of a mission replaces the conventional focus on
proﬁt. We argue that people work harder when they buy into the mission of
the organization and this raises productivity. For a more formal treatment
of these issues, see Besley and Ghatak (2003).
Our approach is stylized, and the main goal is to oﬀer a diﬀerent theo-
retical perspective on both incentives and competition as applied to public
service provision and thereby inform the policy debate. Our framework al-
lows us to understand how productivity in public services can be increased
by competition without appealing to a standard model of market discipline.5
We do not aim to provide a balanced account of various aspects of the policy
debate about public service reform. Moreover, while we do refer to speciﬁc
public services like education and health to illustrate our framework, each of
these cases raise many important case-speciﬁc issues a comprehensive treat-
ment of which is beyond the scope of the paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the key
organizational issues involved in the provision of public services emphasizing
how competition and mission-orientation aﬀects incentives. In section 3 we
compare the three canonical models of public service provision, and evaluate
them in the light of our framework. In section 4 we draw some speciﬁc
organizational lessons concerning public service reform based on our analysis.
In section 5 we address two additional issues, the potential costs of allowing
greater choice and competition if (some) consumers are poorly informed and
in terms of increasing inequalities in access to public services, and factors
governing optimal ownership of public goods.
2T h e A p p r o a c h
In this section we discuss the key organizational issues involved in the provi-
sion of public services, discussing both those that have been discussed in the
and ﬁscal treatment of organizations rather than the nature of the economic activity being
performed. However, there are important debates about institution design in the U.K.(see
Grout and Yong (2003)).
5Le Grand (1991) calls such markets “quasi-markets”.
7existing literature, and those that we emphasize. It is convenient to separate
two diﬀerent organizational dimensions:
• Vertical dimension: This is the classic principal-agent problem. The
main concern is that providers put in less eﬀort than consumers would
wish (shirking) or else may ﬁnd ways of diverting resources to their
own ends (rent extraction). The reform problem is to reduce both of
these problems.
• Horizontal: This concerns the mix of services and the priorities at-
tached. The issue here is making the service mix more closely corre-
spond to what the consumers desire.
In this section we will focus mainly on the vertical dimension. The two
dimensions are, of course, interrelated. For example, the product mix will
govern the incentive problems - a move towards “quality” away from “quan-
tity” will reduce the eﬀectiveness of using high-powered incentive contracts
as quality is harder to measure. Also, empowering consumers means that the
nature of the principal-agent problem changes. The hierarchical or central-







Consumers delegate elected oﬃcials to provide public-services on their be-
half by dealing with service-providers. This model has two layers of agency
problems: between the consumer and elected oﬃcials (which are mediated
through elections or referenda) and between the government and the service





This provides a closer link between consumers and service providers. In
section 5 we will explore further the inter-connections between the vertical
and the horizontal dimensions.
Any organization is a network of principal-agent relationships. The ac-
countability structure deﬁnes the rules of the game, i.e., the chain of com-
mand and control, and the formal authority that each principal and agent
is governed by. As in all such relationships there are informational asym-
metries and monitoring problems, and inducing agents to act according to
the objectives, and coordinating the activities of these various actors are the
key issues of organization design. To illustrate what is special about public
organizations, let us think in terms of the following two examples:
Example 1 A School: The principals are the head-teacher, local education
department oﬃcials/politicians and the parents. The agents are the class-
room teachers.
Example 2 A Hospital: The principals are the hospital administrators, de-
partment of health oﬃcials/politicians and the patients. The agents are the
doctors and patients.
In the standard principal-agent model, there is a single principal to whom
the agent is accountable. For example, in a for-proﬁt ﬁrm every agent, from
the delivery boy to the divisional manager, are all in the ultimate analysis,
accountable to the owner(s) of the ﬁrm. While many people can be aﬀected
b yt h ea c t i o n so ft h ea g e n t ,i nt h ea b s e n c eo fe x t e r n a l i t i e s ,t h e s ec a na l l
be reduced to proﬁts to the principal.6 The existing literature (see Dixit,
1996, 2002 and Burgess and Metcalfe, 1999) has focussed mainly on three
respects in which public-services diﬀer. These are, the presence of multiple
principals, diﬃculty of measuring performance, and the importance of multi-
tasking considerations. We brieﬂy discuss each of these.
6If externalities are present, e.g., the ﬁrms output creates pollution as a by-product
then of course this conclusion needs to be modiﬁed.
9• Measurability: In many cases the services in question are complex
and as a result the objectives of the relevant organizations are some-
what imprecise. For example, the objective of a school is to provide
“good education”, but this is much harder to deﬁne compared to say,
production of rice or provision of banking services or even some public
services such as garbage removal or power supply. This means that in
these cases it would be hard to ﬁnd good performance measures. If
performance measures are noisy, then making rewards very sensitive to
performance does not give eﬀective incentives, and imposes unnecessary
risk on the employee.
• Multi-tasking: One reason why these services are complex is because
they involve several dimensions. For example, good education involves
students being able to achieve high scores in standardized tests, but
also encouraging a spirit of creativity, curiosity and inculcation of good
values. The former is easy to measure but if teachers are rewarded just
on the basis of the performance of students in tests, this might lead
to an excessive focus on test-taking skills at the expense of the other
components of a good education. This makes provision of incentives
hard when employees have to perform multiple tasks (Holmstr¨ om and
Milgrom, 1991). Similarly, if hospitals are given incentives to cut costs,
they are going to sacriﬁce quality by refusing to treat certain types
of illnesses or being excessively selective in using expensive medical
procedures. If the employee has to do several tasks, and some of these
have good performance measures and not others, then making her pay
sensitive to the good performance measures will cause her to substitute
eﬀort away from the other tasks, and could result in a loss of eﬃciency.
• Multiple Principals: As the above examples suggest, public services
typically involve multiple principals. This has been widely recognized
in the literature on incentives (see, for example, Dixit (2002)). There
are several reasons for this. First, by their very nature they generate
direct consumption and production externalities. For example, how
education and health services are provided is a matter of concern for
society as a whole, and not just those who receive the services. Bet-
ter education makes better citizens. Similarly, a healthier population
is less likely to spread infectious diseases. So society at large can be
thought of as an additional principal. Second, due to the presence of
10these direct externalities, these services have to be provided through
second-best arrangements which then generate indirect externalities,
and consequently, another layer of multiple principals. There are sev-
eral actors who are directly aﬀected by the actions of an agent in the
provision of public services. For example, a doctor can be concerned
with the success of a particular treatment method. This can be in
conﬂict with the interests of the hospital management (or tax pay-
ers at large) who would like to minimize costs. This can also be in
conﬂict with patients, who might not wish to be subjects of experi-
mentation. Similarly, a teacher might want to give more emphasis on
learning using expensive teaching aids, as opposed to imparting me-
chanical test-taking skills. This might make the (enlightened) parents
happy, but the school principal or management might care more about
the average test-record of their students, and tax-payers may be more
concerned about the expenses.7 Since each principal would like to in-
duce the agent to put more eﬀort in activities that he cares about more,
if the incentive schemes are not chosen to maximize the joint payoﬀso f
the principals, due to the externalities there will be ineﬃciencies over
and above the basic agency costs. Typically, the distortions are in the
direction of making the incentives facing the agent less high-powered.
If these tasks are complements (or there is a single task which all the
principals care about) then there is a basic free-riding problem which
will lead to lower incentive payments to the agent. If these tasks are
substitutes then each principal would like to pay the agent to do more
of the task he likes and less of the task that he does not like. This
means each principal dilutes the incentives oﬀered by other principals,
m a k i n gt h ea g e n t si n c e n t i v e sl e s sh i g hp o w e r e d .
Without wishing to de-emphasize the importance of these considerations,
we would like to focus on the following three components in the design of
an organization for providing a public-service: mission design, matching and
motivation.
7The presence of multi-tasking considerations clearly compound these problems. As
opposed to some general notion of eﬀort, teachers and doctors perform diﬀerent (and
complex) tasks. These diﬀerent principals might have very diﬀerent preferences over the
outcomes of these tasks. For example, consider how much emphasis the teacher puts
on topics which are controversial (in some parts of the world), such as evolution. This
is similar to the problem that arises if a doctor is keen to push some particular line of
treatment we mentioned earlier.
112.1 Missions
Public service provision often takes place in mission-oriented ﬁrms. The
mission of the organization, displaces the conventional notion of proﬁtm a x -
imization used in the case of private sector organizations. The idea that
missions are important in public organizations is not a new idea. It is a
central plank of James Q. Wilson’s celebrated study of public bureaucracies
(Wilson (1989)). He deﬁnes a mission as a culture “that is widely shared and
warmly endorsed by operators and managers alike.” (page 95). The notion
that the missions of organizations is also an important is a frequent theme in
the literature on non-proﬁt organization (see, for example, Sheehan (1998)).
It is the nature of the activities in question and not whether the service is
provided public or privately that unites mission-oriented organizations.
While the notion of mission is somewhat vague compared to more tan-
gible notions like proﬁt, we believe that it is an important departure when
thinking about what organizations that are not directly responsive to market
forces behave.8 In so far as principal and agents share a view of the mission,
it is likely that an eﬀective mission will economize on monetary incentives.
We assume that the mission of the organization is determined by the
principals in the organization. This can be a heterogeneous group with
overlapping responsibilities. For example, in the case of a school, they are
the parents, the government and the head teacher. Preferences over missions
can be heterogeneous. For example, some parents may value high levels of
discipline. There could also be disagreement on the right curriculum choices
such as the weight to be attached to music teaching or languages. An impor-
tant role of the management in a mission-oriented organization is to foster a
congruent outlook. Thus as Miller (2002) argues in the context of her case
studies of twelve non-proﬁt organizations, “Non-proﬁtb o a r dm e m b e r sd on o t
expect conﬂict between the executive director and the purpose for which the
organization was created. The board believes that the executive manage-
ment will not act opportunistically and that what management actually does
is ensure good alignment and convergence in its relationship with principals.”
(pages 446-7).
Changing the mission of an organization in a way that is not favored
8Missions can also be important in more standard private sector occupations. Firms
frequently profess that their goal is to serve customers rather than to make their share-
holders as rich as possible. However, it is unclear whether these are genuine missions, or
just a veil for some other underlying self-interested behavior.
12by the agents can reduce the eﬃciency of the organization. In that sense,
the approach shows why mission oriented organizations are conservative and
slow moving since there is a rigidity built in from the types of agents who
are attracted to the organizations. Organizations without mission-oriented
agents, such as private ﬁrms, are likely to be more ﬂexible and adaptable.
2.2 Motivation
A key assumption is that the provision of public services beneﬁts from the
eﬀort put in by these agents and that high quality public services require
ah i g hi n t e n s i t yo fe ﬀort. It also depends on the abilities of the service
providers and the quality of the capital inputs that they use. We assume
that this eﬀort is costly and that the agents in question have to be motivated
to put in eﬀort. But rewards to putting in eﬀort are not purely pecuniary
— agents could be motivated to provide high quality services because they
care about the output being produced. However, the non-pecuniary rewards
depend on the way in which the organization is structured. For example,
teachers may care about teaching to a curriculum that they think is most
conducive to learning. Thus, the mission of the organization can aﬀect the
degree to which agents are willing to commit costly eﬀort.
When goods are produced with external beneﬁts, then individuals who
work in the production of these goods may factor the value of the output that
they produce in their decision to work in that sector and into the amount
of eﬀort that they put in. This is the labour market equivalent of the
idea that individuals engage in private supply of public goods and those
with the highest valuation of public goods may have the greatest interest
in contributing. The model could also be one in which individuals are
“altruistically” motivated or that they get a “warm glow” from doing social
good.9 In the former case, the level of the good being produced matters to
the individual, but not who provides it. This can lead to free-riding. In
the latter case, its not the level of the good, but how much the individual
himself/herself contributes to it matters. It is clear that on either of these
views the value of what they do should be attached to the job that they
do and not the sector in which they do it. Thus, if a nurse believes that
nursing is an important social service with external beneﬁts, then it should
9These ideas are also related to the strong professional ethics that govern the behavior
of workers in the production of collective goods. Such ethical codes de-emphasise narrow
self-interest.
13not matter whether she is employed by the public or private sector except in
s of a ra st h i sa ﬀects the amount of the beneﬁt that she can generate.
The general point here is that a system of organization and remuneration
for the provision for public goods will have to take into account not only how
on-the-job incentives aﬀect how those in the sector work, but also who is
attracted to work there. This might alleviate the need to give high-powered
incentives. Francois (2000) has shown the fact that government bureaucrats
are not residual claimants implies that they can commit to a “hands-oﬀ”
policy which elicits greater eﬀort from workers who have “public service mo-
tivation”. However, if individuals diﬀer in terms of how motivated they are,
and in additional have heterogeneous mission-preferences, it is important to
examine the process by which agents are matched to an organization, a topic
which we turn to now.
2.3 Matching
Matching is the process by principals and agents come together to create an
organization. This could be governed by choice as when a parent picks a
school for their child or by government policy. Matching serves an allocative
role in bringing consumers to providers (“product market matching”) and of
workers to providers (“labour market matching”).
If consumers care about the missions adopted in public organizations,
then allowing them to choose between public-service providers with diﬀerent
missions is a potentially important source of welfare improvements. There is
no reason why a consumer could not exercise choice between two competing
hospitals or schools in much the same way that they choose a TV or a car.
It is true that it may be more costly to acquire information about health
care services. Also relationship-speciﬁc investments may be important for
health and education, making switching more costly. But these are diﬀerences
in degree, not in kind. Moreover, complex choices such as provision for
old age are routinely left to private decision making. This application of
private good choice to public services underpins the standard argument for
voucher provision of public services. The state provides the citizens with
a voucher that entitles the individual to a particular service (or it could be
a monetary amount) and they then choose where to spend that voucher.
This is, eﬀectively, the kind of system in place for eye tests for low income
individuals in the U.K..
Principals and agents can match with one another on the basis of the
14perceived mission of the organization. This is a natural consequence of
organizations being mission oriented. This matching increases eﬃciency in
the operation of public service organizations since the returns from putting
in eﬀort are higher when agents share the same goals as those espoused by
the organization.
3 Three Models of Public Service Provision
In this section, we discuss three very stylized models of public service provi-
sion. The ﬁrst is pure market provision — the model on which much of the
discussion of public service reform gets discussed. As outlined below, it has
three distinctive features.
• Model 1: Market Provision
— Missions and consideration of agent motivation are irrelevant.
— Competition works through either intensiﬁcation of the returns to
eﬀort or greater use of yardstick comparisons.
— Monetary incentives matter above all — if measurement of the
agents performance is good, then these will tend to be high pow-
ered.
The fact that the standard market model uses monetary incentives is part
and parcel of the fact that it does not take advantage of agent motivation. It
emphasizes the joys of competition in reducing slack and through the eﬀect
on the process of proﬁt generation and yardstick competition. Both of these
are championed by many parties in the public service reform debate.
• Model 2: Traditional State Provision
— Single centralized mission for all providers.
— Limited use of monetary incentives.
— No competition.
This is the much derided model from which public services are moving.
Key features are the lack of competition and incentives. Moreover, the mis-
sion of the public sector providers is determined centrally with little regard
to the interests of providers and customers
15• Model 3: Decentralized Provision
— Heterogeneous missions.
— Competition by matching of providers, workers and customers.
— Limited use of monetary incentives.
We believe that Model 3 is the right model for an eﬃcient system of public
service delivery in many contexts. It diﬀers from model 2 in emphasizing
decentralization and choice. The role of competition is providing eﬀective
matching in the preferences of principals and agents. It diﬀers from model 1
in de-emphasizing monetary incentives. It is the process of eﬀective matching
that allows organizations to economize on the use of explicit incentives. It
also gives weight to ﬁnding eﬀective means to allow organizations to develop
missions.
4 Lessons
In this section we would like to draw some speciﬁc organizational lessons
concerning public service reform based on our analysis.
• Lesson 1: The importance of choice and competition
In our approach, competition matches principals and agents. This in-
creases organizational eﬃciency by economizing on the need for explicit in-
centives. This mechanism is quite diﬀerent from those that have typically
been studied in either the literature on competition and incentives in public
services or that on competition in principal agent relationships.
The importance of competition was at the heart of the “quasi-market”
reforms that were pushed in the U.K. in the early 1990s. However, the model
of competition that underpins this was never really spelled out. Commenta-
tors on these such as Glennerster (1991) and LeGrand (1991) were sceptical
about the link between these internal markets and the strive for eﬃciency.
However, it is clear that they were thinking about a model based on the role
of competition in sharpening the ﬁrms incentives by reducing managerial
slack via fear of losing pupils or patients. But given that residual claimants
in public services are so ill-deﬁned, it less clear than in a private ﬁrm how
strongly public service providers will have an incentive to resist organization
16contraction. Perhaps, if as suggested by Niskanen (1971), bureaucrats are
budget maximizers, then this has some hope of success. But outside of this
kind of simplistic public choice objective things look less promising.
The theoretical link between competition and eﬀort incentives in princi-
pal agent relationships is also weak in those situations most applicable to
public services. There are two main models. First, competition can aﬀect
the principal’s payoﬀ and the way in which it depends upon the eﬀort of
agents. Thus stronger product market competition could aﬀect the marginal
sensitivity of output to agent eﬀort. The issue is whether more intense com-
petition leads to agents having to work harder to generate a successful return
for the principal, thereby encouraging eﬀort. Second, competition can eﬀect
the information available to the principal through performance comparisons
(so-called yardstick competition). Thus, IBM could choose to reward its
managers according the performance of Hewlett-Packard as a means of en-
couraging greater eﬀort. This makes sense when the two ﬁrms are subject
to similar (unobserved) shocks (see Holmstr¨ om (1999)).
A large literature, reviewed in Nickell (1996), has looked at these argu-
ments. Neither argument yields strong and robust links between intensity of
competition and managerial eﬀort. Arguments based on the way competi-
tion aﬀects the marginal return to managerial eﬀort are quite sensitive to the
exact speciﬁcation of the model. Moreover, even though competition can
intensify the link between proﬁts and eﬀo r t ,i tm a yd os ob yi n c r e a s i n gt h e
extent of the risk to which the manager is exposed (see Raith (2002)). This
may undermine the intensiﬁcation eﬀect to some degree. Also, since product
rents aﬀect the extent to which principals wish to incentivize agents, greater
competition can reduce a ﬁrms’ desire to oﬀer high powered incentives (see
Schmidt (1997)). As Schmidt (1997) shows, the only robust argument that
links competition and eﬀort is via the way that competition increases the
probability that a ﬁrm will be liquidated.
The argument for unambiguous advantages from yardstick competition is
sensitive to the kinds of contracts that agents can be oﬀered. The case is
strong when the principal can oﬀer complete incentives to agents as in Holm-
str¨ om (1999). However, environments with greater contracting frictions,
such as implicit incentive models based on reputation yield more ambigu-
ous results. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) emphasize how greater
information on the performance of agents need not be welfare enhancing in
such situations. However, this has not stopped the use of league tables and
other performance comparisons, quite popular in the U.K., which are clearly
17geared towards greater use of yardstick comparisons.
• Lesson 2: The case for high-powered monetary incentives in public
services is weak
The fact that agents may be motivated may reinforce the tendency to-
wards low powered incentives which has been discussed in the literature. If
the employee receives a non-monetary reward from doing her job well, then
clearly she can be paid both a lower wage and her pay does not have to be
made very sensitive to her performance.
The approach developed here makes clear how the often made claim that
mission alignment is a substitute for monetary incentives works. We would
expect organizations with better matching of mission preferences to rely less
on explicit monetary incentives. Monetary incentives are most important
when principals and agents disagree about the mission. Mission-oriented
organizations should use high powered monetary incentives only if matching
is poor. Cross-sectionally, the approach therefore predicts that higher use
of monetary incentives is likely to be negatively correlated with eﬀort levels
(productivity). This is a striking implication of our framework, as it turns the
conventional view about the superiority of the private sector because it uses
incentive schemes on its head. The so-called New Public Administration (see
Barzelay, 2001) emphasizes the need to incentivize public bureaucracies and
to empower consumers of public services. Relatedly, Osborne and Gaebler
(1993) describe a new vision of public administration emphasizing the scope
for dynamism and entrepreneurship in the public sector. Our approach casts
light on the intellectual underpinning for these approaches. Greater use of
incentives in the public sector is a symptom of poor alignment of missions. It
seems unsurprising that these ideas were born in periods of great bureaucratic
stress — New Zealand and the U.K. in the 1980s both of which were being run
by governments (principals) who did not share the traditional bureaucratic
values.
• Lesson 3: Accountability and incentives are linked.
Think of a proposal to empower parents within a school or patients with
a hospital. Then, if successful, this will increase the weight in the decision
making process attached to their preferences. This may increase or decrease
mission alignment in public organizations. If it decreases it, then other
18forms of motivation (such as monetary incentives) need to be considered.
If congruence in mission alignment is increased as a result of accountability
changes, then the need for incentives is weakened.
Attempts to reform mission oriented organizations by changing account-
ability will often change the quality of existing matches. This explains why
mission oriented organizations are inherently conservative and attests the
diﬃculties in reforming public sector organizations. It may also explain
the preference for bringing in outsiders — so-called political appointees — to
change the organizational culture.
• Lesson 4: Public organizations are less responsive to external shocks
due to their mission-orientation.
Our approach casts some light on responses to change in public organi-
zations that are mission oriented. Because mission preferences are locked-in
by matching, attempts to re-organize modes of working (one form of which
is changes in the structure of accountability discussed above) will lead to
reductions in organizational productivity. This is often portrayed as a de-
cline in morale in organizations that are undergoing major transformation.
Organizations without selection on mission will not face this demoralizing ef-
fect. This provides a possible underpinning for the diﬃculty in re-organizing
public bureaucracies. Over time, as the matching process adjusts to the new
mission, this eﬀect can be undone so we might expect the short and long-run
responses to change to be rather diﬀerent. Empowerment of beneﬁciaries in
public programs is also an important issue. It is frequently suggested that
public organizations work better when members of their client group get
representation and can help to shape the mission of the organization. Thus,
some advocate that parents should be given a greater say in school gov-
ernance. This works ﬁne provided that teachers and parents share similar
educational goals. Otherwise, attempts by parents to intervene will simply
increase the degree of non-alignment of preferences, and reduce the eﬃciency
of schools. Again, we might expect signiﬁcant diﬀerences between short and
long-run responses when matching is endogenous.
195O t h e r I s s u e s
5.1 Costs of Choice and Competition
We have focused here on the potential beneﬁts from allowing for a more het-
erogeneous and diverse set of public services shaped by competing missions.
B u tt h e r ea r ep o t e n t i a lc o s t st o o . H e r ew ed i s c u s st w oo ft h e s e—t h ep o s s i -
bility that consumers are poorly informed and that inequalities in access to
public services will be exacerbated.
5.1.1 Information
There are a number of concerns about the extent to which choice can be
trusted in public service provision. Choice in the provision of private goods
works best when consumers are well-informed. The market may fail to
achieve an eﬃcient outcome for goods which are purchased infrequently or
whose usefulness becomes apparent only after a prolonged period of use. In
such cases poor quality ﬁrms survive for long periods. Without appropriate
legal protection it may also be diﬃcult for consumers to call poor performing
ﬁrms to account for supplying low quality or faulty products. There is a well
established body of regulations which underpin the functioning of markets
and which try to prevent such problems. The market may also provide its
own response in the form of information providers such as the Consumers’
Association and professional associations such as the Law Society.
Choice also creates a premium for informed consumers — those who know
about the quality or public services or are willing to invest in information.
The system of public service provision that has dominated in the UK for
more than ﬁfty years has not been one in which beneﬁciaries have signiﬁcant
gains from being informed. This suggests the need to focus on informa-
tion provision for consumers as part of any reform strategy where choice is
enhanced.
However, this is not easy. The parallel with private pension provision
is telling. Leaving individuals to exercise private choices on such important
life-time decisions must be put along side the evidence on the huge extent
of continuing consumer ignorance on pension issues. Restricting choice may
be paternalistic, however it may save certain groups from make the wrong
decisions. This raises philosophical issues that go beyond the economic
aspects of the problem that this paper focuses on.
205.1.2 Inequality
A further source of concern is the fact that choice and competition are fre-
quently associated with stratiﬁed public services where higher income and
better informed individuals get access to better public services. While so far
we have focused on mission as the basis for supplier and customer matching,
matching could arise on the basis of the degree of motivation of the princi-
pals and agents. Thus, the most committed teachers may end up working
in schools where the parents value education the most.10 This will lead to
schools that are stratiﬁed in terms of quality.
Inequality can also arise as consequence of the production technology for
the provision of public goods — the fact that service quality can depend on
how many and what kinds of customers choose to use the service. The best
analogy for such cases is thinking of joining a club where you care about with
whom you will associate and whether the club facilities will be crowded or
not. The classic example of this in education arises if there are peer group
eﬀects — whereby the amount of learning that my child does is aﬀected by
the behavior and ability of other children in the class. Choice is now more
complex since an individual must anticipate who else will choose to consume
a public service at the point at which they make their consumption choice.
Tiebout (1957) laid out an economic framework for thinking about choice
and competitive provision in this context. He envisaged (local) public goods
being provided by a variety of providers located in jurisdictions with con-
sumers choosing to live in the jurisdiction that came closest to representing
their preferences. In a fully decentralized system, this would involve choosing
both a tax and service provision level. Some consumers who did not value
public services at all could, in principle, opt out altogether while others opt
to pay more tax and receive more services. In Tiebout’s world, it is local
taxes that “clear the market”. In the U.K., there is evidence that house
prices may play some role in doing this in the case of schools (see Gibbons
and Machin (2002)).
One key feature of the Tiebout world is that public goods provision is
stratiﬁed. This stratiﬁcation could be by income or quality of service. There
is clearly a tension between pursuing goals of equality in service provision
and greater decentralization and choice when the production process depends
on who else is consuming the good (see Epple and Romano (2002)). This
10Of course, this possibility is undermined if teachers care directly about inequality in
educational provision.
21dilemma is put well in Le Grand (1991, p. 1266) as follows: “In education,
selective schools may arise that cream oﬀ the most able pupils leaving ‘sink’
schools for the remainder. Health care providers, such as GPs with practice
budgets, or self-governing hospitals, will compete for the custom of the young
and comparatively healthy, while ignoring the elderly or chronically sick. In
social care, residential homes will compete for healthy elderly people, while
ignoring those who are senile and incontinent. Since there is likely to be a
greater concentration of the ‘bad risks’ among the poor and deprived, the
latter may end up receiving fewer services relative to those received by the
better-oﬀ, thus widening inequality”.
This is a real trade-oﬀ and indeed, if these costs in terms of inequality
are signiﬁcant then they could wipe out the potential eﬃciency gains from
decentralization. However, the centralized model of the welfare state too has
costs in terms of eﬃciency, and indeed some in terms of inequality (Le Grand
1991). Unfortunately, the evidence is scarce and inconclusive.11
There are some hybrid models that do not ﬁt either the pure versions of
the centralized and the competitive models. In principle, externalities that
cause inequalities could be dealt with by appropriate adjustments in funding
formulae which “price” the externalities in question. One speciﬁc idea along
these lines has been suggested in the literature on school vouchers which are
often rejected on grounds of inequity (see Ladd, 2002). This is to adjust the
voucher amounts to characteristics of students (e.g., students who come from
a poor background or belong to minority groups, or those who are disabled
would receive larger vouchers) and to the characteristics of the schools (e.g.,
schools that are economically or otherwise more integrated would receive
larger vouchers) . Obviously this scheme may be diﬃcult to implement. If
that is the case one should try to ﬁnd other, more implementable, measures
that address the inequality issue in a world with greater choice in public
services before concluding that the “one-size-ﬁts-all” solution is the only
feasible one.
Also, while the problem of increasing inequality with greater choice is
a legitimate concern, it is not inevitable. Many of proponents of school
competition in the U.S. have argued that it is a “tide that lifts all boats”
(Hoxby (2001)). Proponents of Foundation Hospitals make similar claims.
The key issue is whether competition and decentralization can increase pro-
11See Ladd (2002) and Hoxby (2003) for a review of the evidence in the context of
education.
22ductivity in some places without reducing it others. Increases in inequality
from such improvements are harder to argue against than those that increase
productivity in some places at the expense of others.
5.2 The Role of Ownership
The current policy agenda is putting more weight on solutions involving
continued public ﬁnance with less reliance on public provision. The trend
towards contracting out which began long ago is one version of this. The
current debates are even more far-reaching. For example, should we go even
beyond contracting out and just use vouchers and rely on market provision?
This raises fundamental questions about the boundaries of the public sector.
What is the role of ownership in the context of public goods and services?
How is resource allocation aﬀected if the government decides to provide a
service in-house, or contracts out provision to a for-proﬁt or a non-proﬁt ﬁrm?
As emphasized in the introduction, ownership is an aspect of organization
design the goal of which is to provide the best possible incentives to the
various actors.
It is now well-understood that situations where ownership matters for
incentives is one where contracts are incomplete and subject to renegotia-
tion. According to the property rights approach pioneered by Oliver Hart,
Sanford Grossman and John Moore (see Hart (1995)), the allocation of own-
ership aﬀects incentives to undertake non-contractible relationship-speciﬁc
investments in a project. Because these investments are not contractible,
there is some ex post bargaining over the surplus that is generated by these
investments. As ownership positively aﬀects bargaining power you can al-
ways threaten to ﬁre the other parties it improves the investment incentive of
the owner, but reduces that of non-owners. The optimal ownership structure
is one that is associated with the highest surplus. Besley and Ghatak (2001)
develop a theory of ownership in public goods provision which is relevant to
the study of public service provision.
Consider a simple example. Suppose there are two parties, A and B. B
can undertake two possible levels of investment, high and low, and the costs
of these two types of investment are 2 and 0. A does not undertake any
investment. When B undertakes the low investment, total proﬁts are 10, but
with the high investment total proﬁts are 15. From the social point of view,
clearly the high investment should be undertaken by B since the marginal
gain, 5, exceeds the marginal cost, 2. Assume if B walks out of the project
23after the investments are undertaken, A can realize only 80% of the potential
proﬁts because part of the investment is embodied in the human capital of B.
However, if A walks out B can realize the full return of the project. Assume
further that the party that walks out (or is ﬁred) has an outside option of 0.
If the investment choices of B are contractible, or the proﬁt levels are
contractible, then B should be paid a fee of 2 or more, conditional on the high
investment being undertaken, or conditional on proﬁts being high and that
should result in the eﬃcient outcome irrespective of ownership. But suppose
due to transactions costs, neither B’s investments nor the proﬁt levels are
contractible. B will not have an incentive to undertake the investment if
A makes an up front payment because of its non-contractibility. Similarly,
A will not have an incentive to make a transfer to B if proﬁts are high.
Rather, the parties are likely bargain over the surplus after the investment is
sunk, and the choice of investment would depend on the share of the surplus
received by the investing party.
If A is the owner, he can threaten to ﬁre B. If the high investment is
chosen, the outside options are 15*(0.8) = 12 for A, and 0 for B.U s i n gt h e
Nash bargaining solution, in this case, B receives a proﬁt of (15 - 12)/2 =
1.5, and A ap r o ﬁt of (15+12)/2 = 13.5. B’s proﬁts are less than the cost
of investment, 2. Therefore anticipating this hold-up problem B would not
invest if A is the owner. In contrast if B is the owner, he can threaten to ﬁre
A.N o wB receives a proﬁt of (15 + 15)/2 = 15 and A ap r o ﬁt of (15 - 15)/2
=0. B’s proﬁts are higher than the cost of investment and so he invests.
The above example shows that as B’s investment being more important
for the project than A’s, B should optimally be made the owner. If A too
could undertake some investment, and if both A’s and B’s investment de-
cisions were sensitive to incentives, ownership would depend on the relative
importance of the investments of the parties involved. This is one of the
key insights of the Grossman-Hart-Moore framework. In the simple example
above, where there is a single investor, it obviously follows that this investor
should own the asset. Ownership by any other party would only undermine
her incentives, without brining in any gains.
Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that this conclusion is signiﬁcantly af-
fected if we consider public goods and services. They show that it may be
optimal to transfer ownership of a public project to private sector organi-
z a t i o n ss u c ha sn o n - p r o ﬁts on the grounds that they care relatively more
about the beneﬁts generated by such projects. This result holds regardless
of whether such organizations are also the key investors. This result reﬂects
24a key property of public goods — during the renegotiation of the project for a
public good, each party values the project whether or not they are actually
involved in it. Contractual incompleteness implies that ownership of a public
project should reside with the party that cares most about the project being
successful. This gives the best investment incentives to that party, as well
as to others. This highlights the fact that, when public goods are being con-
sidered, the motivation of providers is important and not just technological
factors typically highlighted in the context of private goods.
Lets us modify the above example to illustrate this case. Suppose the
outcome of the project is an improvement in the quality of a school. A gets a
payoﬀ of 14 when B undertakes the high investment, and a payoﬀ of 10 when
B undertakes the low investment. B’s payoﬀs are 1 and 0 respectively, so
that the total beneﬁts are the same as in the case where the project involved
a private good. Everything else is as before. If A is the owner then in the
event of disagreement B now gets a payoﬀ of 1*(0.8)= 0.8 (since this is a
public good, otherwise she would get 0), and A gets a payoﬀ of 14*(0.8)=
11.2 and so B’s equilibrium payoﬀ is (15- 11.2 + 0.8 )/2= 2.3 >2. So B
invests. But B is the owner in the event of disagreement B gets a payoﬀ of
1a n dA gets a payoﬀ of 14 (once again, because this is a public good) and
so B’s equilibrium payoﬀ is (15- 14 + 1 )/2= 1<2. In this case, B therefore
does not invest.
Hence, ownership by A yields the joint surplus maximizing level of invest-
ment in this example. Thus, it may be optimal for the party that does not
have a comparative advantage in any task or important speciﬁc investments
to undertake, to own the project. Ownership acts as a commitment device
to reward investments in the public project. This undercuts the eﬃciency
argument that is often made against government ownership. If the govern-
ment has a higher valuation for a public good, it should be the owner since
that allows it to credibly commit to ﬁn a n c ei t .A tt h es a m et i m e ,i tg i v e sa
reason why an non-proﬁt organization might be involved as an owner, if they
happen to have a higher valuation.
6 Concluding Comments
When it comes to public service reform, what matters for eﬀective deliv-
ery of public goods and services are accountability structures and incentives.
Ownership issues are given far too much weight in existing debates about
25public service reforms. We have argued that the mission of organizations is
important in motivating agents in public services. It is important to think
about how the mission of the organization and hence the motivation of the
agents are aﬀected by proposals to reform public services. The main poten-
tial for competition in public services lies in achieving matching providers
and employees in the labor market and in matching customers to providers.
Better matching reduces the need for giving incentives and can enhance pro-
ductivity. This logic underpins the move towards greater decentralization
and choice in public service provision.
Each public service comes with its own set of issues and problems. While
we feel that model 3 from section 3 above has general merits as a model of
public services, it is likely to be most relevant when three things are true —
(i) there are a variety of legitimate missions which customers and producers
care about (ii) unmonitored eﬀort is an important component of production
and (iii) consumers are suﬃciently well-informed (or can be made so) about
the options available. In relatively monolithic public services, the argument
for choice and variety is weak. The model seems very compelling in the
case of education and in some kinds of health care provision. It does not
seem particularly relevant in postal services, processing tax returns or issuing
passports. The latter are cases where the “private sector” model seems more
compelling. Traditional arguments for the use of yardstick competition may
also have an important role to play.
The notion that competition in public services and greater decentraliza-
tion can be valuable is far from new.12 However, the literature has lacked
a framework that ties together competition, incentives and accountability
when the objectives of the organizations is not proﬁt-maximization. We
have stressed here that the value of competition need not work via a public
service provider’s revenue function (i.e., whether your sales drop as you have
more rivals), as it does in the conventional “industrial organization” model
of competition. Instead competition leads to better alignment on mission
preferences. This attenuates incentive problems and allows the organization
to better serve the interests of consumers as well as attaining higher levels
of productive eﬃciency.
But there are legitimate concerns. Public service reform of the kind that
we have described puts a premium on mobility and information which is
12See, for example, Glennerster (1991), LeGrand (1991) and LeGrand and Bartlett
(1993).
26likely to favor the rich. The approach that we outline emphasizes that gains
for some do not necessarily come at the expense of losses to others. Indeed,
it is possible (theoretically) that the quality of all public services improves.
Clearly, this is the rosy scenario on which many current policy initiatives are
premised. The reality will become clear in due course. At the same time,
it is clear that the centralized model with little diversity and a lot adminis-
trative costs is now on the back foot. Our approach discusses the drawbacks
theoretically. However, theory (at best) can only help us understand the big
picture a bit better in the light of available evidence. In the path ahead of
us the challenge lies in the details.
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